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Abstract
The option to pick a suitable governmental system is greatly determined by political stability and effectivity 
considerations.  Presidential system used in Indonesian constitutional system is designed along with the 
format of multiparty which highly requires coalitions among political parties in the parliament. This feature 
is actually an original or a real character of parliamentary system. It stems from and is developed well in 
the system. In this article, it will be described the problems based on empirical experiences of Indonesian 
Presidential cabinet which is struggling with the multiparty system.
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Intisari
Pemilihan	 model	 pemerintahan	 amat	 ditentukan	 oleh	 pertimbangan	 terhadap	 stabilitas	 dan	 efektifitas	
dari	pemerintahan.	Sistem	Presidensil	yang	diterapkan	di	Indonesia	didesain	dengan	format	multiapartai,	
yang	amat	menghendaki	koalisi	dalam	partai	politik	di	parlemen.	Ciri	ini	sebenarnya	amat	cocok	(lahir	
dan	 tumbuh	subur)	dalam	sistem	parlementer.	Dalam	tulisan	 ini	dideskripsikan	mengenai	problematika	
yang berangkat dari pengalaman empiris cabinet pemerintahan yang telah berlangsung di Indonesia dalam 
desain presidensil yang multipartai. 
Kata Kunci: koalisi, presidensil, multipartai.
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A. Background
The	dynamics	of	governmental	management	
in Indonesia have continually changed and 
developed	 along	 with	 the	 political	 dynamics	 for	
the past decades. The condition has been certainly 
influenced	 by	 many	 political,	 legal,	 and	 social	
factors	 existed	 in	 Indonesian	 constitutional	 and	
political	system	after	 the	amendments	of	the	1945	
Constitution	of	the	Republic	of	Indonesia.
Related	 to	 political	 cases	 in	 Indonesia,	 a	
stable	 and	 effective	 governmental	 management	
process has become a very important element in 
order to make many relevant policies and programs, 
especially,	when	the	policy	and	program	are	closely	
related to the development issues. 
The opportunity to choose a governmental 
system	among	a	variety	of	designs	and	examples	in	
the	world	 is	 higly	 related	 to	 the	motives	 to	 reach	
political	stability	and	effectivity	of	the	governmental	
management	process	itself.	Moreover,	there	are	also	
many	 factors	 influencing	 the	management	 such	as	
political	system	and	practices,	recruitment	model	of	
political	and	public	officers,	the	power	configurations	
between	 local	 and	 national	 government,	 and	 the	
configurations	of	political	and	institutional	relations	
between	executive	branch	and	legislative	assembly.	
In presidential or parliamentary system,1 
political and governmental stability are the main 
stakes	for	the	regime.	In	parliamentarism	model,	the	
stability	 instrument	 is	 characterized	 by	 the	 fusion	
of	 executive	 and	 legislative	 power,	 achieved	 by	
the mechanism that the government needs the vote 
of	 confidence	 from	 the	majority	 in	 the	 legislative	
assembly	 in	order	 to	get	and	maintain	 the	power.2 
On the contrary, presidentialism model applies 
the	 separation	 of	 power	 and	 function	 between	
the	 president	 and	 parliament	 as	 the	 axis	 for	 the	
governmetal	stability	so	 there	 is	no	room	for	both	
branches	 to	 dissolve	 mutually.	 Further,	 the	 fixed-
term	of	office	for	the	president	has	strengthened	the	
characteristic	of	the	design. 3 
The	forms	and	models	of	political	coalitions	
in Indonesia have dynamically developed and 
changed	 along	 with	 the	 political	 and	 democratic	
practices.	The	conditions	are	influenced	by	the	form	
of	political	relations	and	interests	among	the	actors	
in	executive	and	legislative	branch.	For	the	further	
extent,	 it	has	been	much	affecting	political	parties	
to	build	the	form	and	pattern	of	political	relations	in	
supporting the cabinet. 
Empirically,	 in	 Indonesian	 political	
experiences,	 coalition	 is	 something	 which	 can	
not	 be	 avoided.	 It	 is	 affected	 by	 many	 factors,	
i.e:	 the	 multiparty	 system	 itself,	 a	 juvenile	 term	
of	 presidential	 democracy	 which	 has	 been	 just	
maintained	 for	 almost	 fourteen	 years	 since	 the	
last	 amendment	 of	 the	 1945	 Constitution	 of	 the	
Republic	of	Indonesia	(in	another	word,	Indonesian	
democracy	 is	still	 looking	for	a	political	balance),	
a	 variety	 of	 policy	 preferences	 and	 interests	 from	
each political party in Parliament, and last but not 
least,	the	desire	of	the	parties	to	reach	and	maintain	
the	powers	in	government	or	to	be	around	the	circle	
of	power	in	the	context	of	enlarging	their	influence	
and	existence.	
Related	 to	 the	 problems,	 this	 article	 is	
basically	made	to	describe	and	to	analyze	-	through	
qualitative	 and	 theoretical	 approach	 -	 the	 model	
or	 form	of	political	coalitions	and	relations	which	
have been dynamically going on in Indonesian 
1 Any	variation	in	governmental	system	and	the	modifications	of	the	model,	out	of	the	two	popular	mainstreams,	will	consider	stability	of	the	
cabinet	as	one	of	the	important	dimensions.	
2 Jose	A.	Cheibub,	“Systems	of	Government:	Parliamentarism	and	Presidentialism”,	http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Acrobat/stm103%20
articles/Cheibub_Pres_Parlt.pdf 	accessed	on	12	January	2016.
3 Research	by	Scott	Mainwaring	and	Juan	J.	Linz	had	stated	different	 results	and	conclusions	 that	 several	 features	of	presidential	 systems	
contribute	to	explaining	why	so	few	have	become	stable	democracies	are	the	possibility	of	prone	to	immobilism,	weak	executive	power,	and	
destabilizing	 executive/legislative	 conflict	 than	parliamentary	 systems.	See	Scott	Mainwaring,	 “Presidentialism,	Multiparty	Systems,	 and	
Democracy:	The	Difficult	Equation”, Working Paper #14, Kellogg Institute, September 1990, pp. 9. Further, Linz added that parliamentary 
democracy	 is	 more	 stable	 than	 the	 presidential.	 That’s	 because	 the	 concept	 of	 parliamentarism	 provides	 a	 more	 flexible	 and	 adaptable	
institutional	 context	 for	 the	 establishment	 and	 consolidation	 of	 democracy.	 The	 fusion	 between	 the	 cabinet	 formation	 and	 the	 coalition	
in	parliament	would	 foster	 responsible	decision	making	and	would	encourage	genuine	party	competition	without	causing	undue	political	
fragmentation.	See	Juan	J.	Linz,	“The	Perils	of	Presidentialism”,	Journal of Democracy,	Vol.	1,	No.	1,	1990,	pp.	51-69.
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presidential	 system	 after	 the	 amendments	 of	 the	
1945	Constitution	of	the	Republic	of	Indonesia.		
B. Research Results
1. Indonesian Presidential System After the 
Amandments of Constitution
According	 to	 Bagir	 Manan,	 Indonesian	
presidential	system,	before	the	amendments	of	the	
1945	Constitution	had	some	resemblances	with	the	
American	presidential	system,	with	several	special	
characters.4 Although it might be right, many 
scholars argues that Indonesian governmental model 
before	the	amendments	was	not	a	pure	presidential.	
That’s	because	the	system	was	combined	with	some	
parliamentary	 features.	 One	 of	 designs	 was	 the	
responsibility	obligation	mechanism	of		President	to	
the	Indonesian	People	Assembly	(MPR)	which	was	
notably	believed	as	one	of	the	form	of	parliamentary	
institutions.	 Moreover,	 there	 were	 roles	 of	 the	
assembly	to	assign	the	president	by	giving	him/her	
a	constitutional	mandate	or	to	terminate	the	term	of	
office	through	a	political	reason.5 
It	is	really	different	when	we	see	the	Indonesian	
presidential	 model	 after	 the	 amendments	 period.	
One	of	the	prominent	features	of	the	presidentialism	
designed in the amended Indonesian constitution is 
Article	 7C	which	 regulates	 that	 the	 President	 has	
no	 power	 to	 freeze	 and/or	 dissolve	 the	 House	 of	
Representatives.6 
The	 other	 features	 from	 the	 amendments	
of	 constitutions	 indicating	 the	 application	 of	 pure	
presidential	system	in	Indonesia	are	as	follows:
a. The	use	of	‘President’	terminology	as	
a description to presidential roles as 
a	 head	 of	 government	 and	 a	 head	 of	
state.	 The	 separation	 of	 both	 roles	 is	
one	 of	 the	 features	 of	 parliamentary	
model.
b.	 The	principle	of	separation	of	powers,	
according	 to	 Article	 1	 verse	 (2),	
denotes that no single branch is more 
supreme than the others. 
c.	 The	application	of	President	and	Vice-
President direct election, according to 
Article	6A	which	is	separated	with	the	
direct	election	for	legislative	members.	
So,	 there	 is	 no	 fusion	 between	 the	
composition	 of	 political	 parties	 in	
parliament	 and	 the	 election	 of	 the	
President. 
d. Legislation role has been given back to 
parliament	(DPR),	according	to	Article	
5	verse	 (1),	 and	 the	President	 is	only	
one	of	the	inisiator.	
e.	 The	 promotion	 and	 dismissal	 of	 a	
Minister	is	a	prerogative	power	of	the	
President	without	any	consideration	or	
consent	 required	 from	 the	 parliament	
(DPR),	 according	 to	Article	 17	 verse	
(2).	
f.	 5	 (five)	years	fixed-term	of	office	 for	
President	 and	 Vice-President	 accor-
ding	to	Article	7.7
g. According to the constitution, President 
is no longer responsible to any 
political institution but to the people. 
This principle is as a legal and political 
consequence	of	the	implementation	of	
direct	election	for	President	and	Vice-
President.8
From the constitutional provisions above, 
we	 can	 conclude	 that	 the	 governmental	 model	
used	 in	 Indonesian	 constitutional	 system	 after	 the	
amendments	is	no-longer	a	semi-presidentialsm	but	
a pure presidential system. 
The problem is that pure presidential system is 
not	designed	like	the	American	presidentialsm	with	
only	 two	 strong	 and	 established	 political	 parties.	
4 Bagir	Manan,	1999,	Lembaga Kepresidenan,	Gama	Media,	Yogyakarta,	pp.	59.
5 Furthermore,	the	amendments	have	also	changed	other	political	institutions	functionally	and	institutionally.	These	adjustments	have	already	
made	 Indonesian	 governmental	 system	 purer	 than	 before	 the	 amendments	 of	 the	 constitution.	 See	 Jimly	Asshiddiqie,	 2005,	 Implikasi 
Perubahan UUD 1945 Terhadap Pembangunan Hukum Nasional,	MKRI,	Jakarta,	pp.	37.
6 Historically,	some	political	experts	hold	that	the	article	was	a	respond	to	former	Indonesian	President	Abdurrahman	Wahid	(Gus	Dur)	who	
ever	issued	a	Decree	to	dissolve	the	parliament.	But,	in	a	conceptual	perspective,	some	others	also	argued	that	the	existence	of	the	article	is	a	
natural	thing	because	we	picked	presidentialsm	and	separation	of	power	as	the	mainstreams	in	the	constitution.
7	 Impeachment	process	is	also	designed	in	Article	7A	of	Indonesian	constitution.
8	 In	practice,	there	is	a	political	convention	for	the	President	to	convey	an	annual	performance	report	of	the	cabinet	in	parliament,	but	this	can	
not	be	justified	as	form	of	responsibility	mechanism	to	Parliament	like	a	Prime	Minister	does	in	parliamentary	system.	
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Unfortunately,	 Indonesian	 presidential	 model	 is	
combined	 with	 multiparty	 system	 which	 opens	
many political parties to participate in government 
and	 parliament	 through	 direct	 election.	Moreover,	
the	amendment	of	Indonesian	constitution	has	given	
bigger	and	stronger	power	for	Indonesian	parliament	
in overseeing the President and the cabinet. Thus, it 
makes the Parliament looks more supreme than the 
President.  
2. Multiparty Presidential and Model of 
Coalitions
Presidential	 system	 was	 created	 as	 a	
democratic alternative or comparison to the 
parliamentary government. The option to use a 
certain governmental model and to combine it 
with	another	feature	is	entirely	a	political	question.	
Ideally,	 the	 option	 to	 decide	 a	 suitable	 form	 of	
party	 system	 is	 related	 to	 many	 relevant	 factors,	
such	 as	 multi-ethnic	 groups	 or	 society,	 historical	
dimensions,	or	effective	and	stable	government.	As	
Linz suggests that every country has unique aspects 
that one must take into account.9 
Multiparty	system	consists	of	more	than	two	
dominant political parties. The system is believed as 
a	product	of	a	complex	or	multi-cultural	society.10 
Multiparty	 system	 is	 very	 compatible	 when	 it	 is	
applied in a plural nation like Indonesia. As lijphart11 
states	 that	 in	 plural	 societies,	 with	 sharp	 cultural,	
ethnic, religious, or linguistic cleavages, multiparty 
systems could be more propitious in promoting 
stable democracy. 
Related	 to	 the	 governmental	 system,	
multiparty is considered to be more compatible 
when	it	is	combined	with	the	parliamentary	system.	
Because	 in	 parliamentary	model,	 the	 cabinet	 (led	
by	 the	 Prime	 Minister)	 is	 born	 and	 shaped	 from	
the political consensus among dominant parties 
in	 parliament	 which	 intend	 to	 build	 a	 stable	
government or cabinet. Although, there is a room 
for	 the	 parliament	 to	 dissolve	 the	 Prime	Minister	
and	the	cabinet	(and	also	for	the	PM	to	do	the	same	
thing),	 but	 in	 the	 name	 of	 the	 stability,	 there	will	
be	 so	 much	 political	 and	 consensual	 effort	 and	
interest to maintain and to keep the cabinet as long 
as possible.12
In	 a	 multi-party	 parliamentary	 system,	
coalition	of	political	parties	to	dominate	the	cabinet	
and parliament is an absolute option. It is a logical 
consequence in order to assure the cabinets enjoy a 
stable	and	effective	political	environment	to	promote	
policies and programs. As Lijphart mentioned 
that	 in	 parliamentary	 systems	 of	 government,	
cabinets	have	to	be	formed	so	that	they	will	enjoy	
the	confidence	of-or	will	at	 least	be	tolerated	by	a	
parliamentary majority.13
The	 condition	 is	 totally	 different	 with	 the	
presidential	system	of	government.	Instead	of	taking	
the	fusion	of	the	two	branches,	presidential	system	
(as	mentioned	before)	predicates	its	stability	feature	
by separating the cabinet and the parliament.14 As 
the	 consequences,	 frictions	 and	 strained	 relations	
between	the	president	and	parliament	become	more	
potential in presidential system. This condition 
could	possibly	occur	for	a	long	period	of	time	unless	
the	president	and	cabinet	resign	from	the	office	or	
political	 consensus	 between	 the	 parties	 taken	 into	
account. 
Coalitions in presidential system could 
happen	when	the	cabinet	or	government	is	trapped	
in	a	divided	condition.		Divided	government	refers	
just	to	presidential	systems	in	which	no	single	party	
controls both the assembly and the presidency. 
9 Juan	J.	Linz,	Op.cit., p. 69.
10 Efriza,	2012,	Political Explore: Sebuah Kajian Ilmu Politik,	Alfabeta,	Bandung,	p.	293.	
11 Scott	Mainwaring,	Op.cit., p. 3. 
12 Juan	J.	Linz,	Op.cit., pp.	51-69.	We	can	also	conclude	that	the	main	reason	of	using	the	separation	of	powers	principle	to	divide	the	three	
political	branches	was	possibly	not	intended	to	build	an	effective	and	a	stable	government	but,	instead,	in	order	to	make	an	accountability	
mechanism	for	the	president	and	to	avoid	a	concentration	of	powers.	In	another	thought,	the	meaning	and	the	idea	of	a	“stable	government”	in	
both	systems	were	designed	from	two	different	perspectives.			
13 Arend Lijphart, 1999, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty­Six Countries,	Yale	University	Press,	New	
Heaven, p. 91.
14 Scott	Mainwaring,	Op.cit., p. 9. 
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Divided	government	 thus	arises	not	 just	when	 the	
assembly	and	the	presidency	are	in	different	partisan	
hands.15 
Literally, coalitions can be considered as a 
unification.	 Coalitions	 are	 groups	 of	 individuals	
who	 deliberately	 and	 independently	 interact	
and	 structure	 the	 joint	 institution	 outside	 formal	
organizations.	 This	 type	 of	 coaliton	 is	 usually	
perceived	 as	 a	 mutual-benefit	 relation	 among	 the	
internal members, problems and critical issues 
oriented-group,	 and	 it	 needs	 mutual	 actions	 from	
each	member	of	the	coalitions.16 
In	 accordance	 with	 Lijphart’s	 argumen-
tations,17 a coalition model can be built or predicted 
through	6	(six)	coalition	theories,	i.e.:	First,	Minimal	
Winning	Coalitions.	By	using	 the	 “size-principle”	
of	William	H.	Riker’s	 theory,	 this	model	 predicts	
that	 minimal	 winning	 coalitions	 will	 be	 formed	
through	 winning	 (majority)	 coalitions	 in	 which	
only those parties participate that are minimally 
necessary to give the cabinets majority status. One 
of	the	factors	which	force	the	parties	to	collaborate	
is	that	political	parties	are	interested	in	maximizing	
their	power	through	holding	as	many	of	the	cabinet	
positions as possible.
Second,	 Minimum	 Size	 Coalitions.	 By	
quoting	Lijphart’s	 idea,	 if	political	parties	want	 to	
exclude	 unnecessary	 partners	 from	 a	 coalition	 to	
maximize	their	share	of	cabinet	power,	they	should	
also	be	expected	to	prefer	the	cabinet	to	be	based	on	
the	narrowest	possible	parliamentary	majority.
Third,	Coalitions	with	the	Smallest	Number	
of	Parties.	This	 theory	 is	 based	on	 the	 concept	 of	
“bargaining	 proposition”	 proposed	 by	 Michael	
Leiverson. This theory argues that minimal 
winning	coalitions	will	tend	to	involve	the	smallest	
possible	 number	 of	 parties,	 because	 negotiations	
and	bargaining	(about	the	formation	of	a	coalition)	
are easier to complete, and a coalition is easier to 
hold	together,	other	things	being	equal,	with	fewer	
parties.
Fourth,	 Minimal	 Range	 Coalitions.	 This	
theory makes the plausible assumption that it is 
easier	to	form	and	maintain	coalitions	among	parties	
with	similar	policy	preferences	than	among	parties	
that	are	far	apart	in	this	respect.	
Fifth,	 Minimal	 Connected	 Winning	
Coalitions. According to the theory proposed by 
Robert	Axelrod	(1970)	that	coalitions	will	be	formed	
by	inviting	“connected”	party	that	is	adjacent	on	the	
policy	scale	and	devoid	of	unnecessary	partners.	The	
underlying	assumption	of	this	theory	is	that	parties	
will	try	to	coalesce	with	their	immediate	neighbors	
and	that	other	adjacent	parties	will	be	added	until	a	
majority	coalition	is	formed.
Lastly,	Policy-Viable	Coalitions.	This	theory	
assumes that parties truly care only about policy 
instead	 of	 holding	 office,	 real	 power	 resides	 in	
the	 legislature,	where	major	 new	 policies	 have	 to	
be enacted, rather than in the cabinet. This theory 
proposes	 the	 importance	 of	 “core	 party”	 which	
contains	the	median	members	of	parliament	to	care	
about a policy.
One	of	the	main	issues	in	this	article	is	what	
would	happen	with	 the	cabinet	when	a	multiparty	
system	is	combined	with	presidential	system;	would	
it be making the cabinet and democracy stable and 
effective.	 Scott	 mainwaring,18 through his prior 
research, stated that coalition building tends to be 
more problematic in presidential systems than in 
parliamentary	 systems	 because	 of	 differences	 in	
how	executive	power	is	formed	and	maintained.		
Related	 to	 this	 case,	 Azari,	 Brown,	 and	
Nwokora,	 took	 examples	 from	 several	 cases	 in	
American	presidential	management	process,	which	
leads to the conclusion that leadership capacity 
is	 the	 essence	 of	 the	 presidency.	 But	 effective	
presidential leadership must balance the national 
demands	against	partisan	pressures.	This	is	one	of	
the	interesting	parts	of	the	leadership	dilemma.19 
15 Gary	W.	Cox	and	Matthew	D.	Mccubbins,	 “The	 Institutional	Determinants	of	Ecoomic	Policy	Outcomes”,	http://wcfia.harvard.edu/files/
wcfia/files/671_mccubbins_cox.pdf , accessed	10	Januari	2016.
16 Efriza,	Op.cit., p. 314. 
17	 Arend Lijphart, 1999, Op.cit.,	p.	92-99.
18	 Scott	Mainwaring,	Op.cit., p. 4.
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A President in multiparty system should have 
the	ability	and	skill	to	see	similarities	of	policy	and	
interest	 preferences	 among	 the	 political	 parties	 in	
parliament and then to elaborate them to be a real 
political relation. Political coalition becomes more 
inevitable,	although,	in	the	process,	there	will	be	a	
clear	potential	for	the	coalitions	to	dissolve.20
Related	to	role	and	problems	of	the	political	
parties, according to Apter,21 established parties 
in	 many	 countries	 within	 a	 multicultural	 society,	
basically, tend to break or separate and to be 
independent mutually. Those parties do not have a 
desire	to	make	a	coalition.	But,	when	the	country	has	
more	than	two	or	many	parties	involved	in	political	
system,	it	may	influences	them	to	initiate	bargaining	
process to make a coalition in the cabinet. 
If	the	cabinet	tends	to	compromise,	then	the	
compromist	government	will	bring	some	consensual	
interests and decisions.22	Lijphart	took	an	example	
of	the	American	experience	as	one	of	the	empirical	
data,	arguing	that	the	clearest	example	of	executive-
legislative	balance	in	USA,	typical	of	the	consensus	
model	 of	 democracy,	 and	 the	 first	 characteristics	
of	 the	 consensus	 model	 are	 executive	 power-
sharing	and	grand	coalitions.	The	presidency	would	
have	to	be	made	collegial	in	order	to	facilitate	the	
consensual	requirement	of	power-sharing.23
In	 that	 system,	 one	 of	 the	 duties	 of	 the	
president	and	his/her	supporting	party	 is	acting	as	
a	 coalition	 builder.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 challenge	 of	
uniting	 disparate	 groups	 with	 competing	 interests	
and	values	acquires	much	of	its	complexity	because	
presidents	 build	 coalitions	 in	 markedly	 different	
arenas.24 
Further, in order to build and maintain the 
harmony	 of	 the	 political	 relation	 in	 a	 multiparty	
system,	president	has	to	use	all	his	political	and	non-
political	 modalities	 and	 capacity.	 The	 president’s	
resources	 can	 be	 including	 the	 bargaining	 powers	
that	come	with	the	position,	professional	reputation,	
and public prestige.25 
In	 the	 context	 of	 presidential	 system,	
President	also	serves	as	both	defenders	of	national	
interest	 and	 the	 leaders	 of	 their	 political	 parties.	
Unfortunately,	those	are	often	incompatible	roles.26 
The	discrepancy	is	caused	by	the	different	political	
intentions	and	values	of	both	interests.	Frequently,	
party’	 interest	 is	 not	 accordance	 to	 the	 national	
concerns.27
Pursuant	 to	 the	 obstacles	 described	 before,	
the presidential stability instrument through 
separation	of	purpose	and	power	principle	becomes	
more	problematic	and	fragile.	This	is	also	one	of	the	
main	drawbacks	of	presidential	 design,	 because	 it	
potentially causes deadlock and paralysis in policy 
making process.28	Based	on	data	for	all	presidential	
democracies	 that	 existed	 [..],	 (it)	 shows	 (a)	 that	
characteristics	 of	 the	 electoral	 and	 party	 sistems	
do	 affect	 the	 level	 of	 support	 for	 the	 president	 in	
congress	 and	 hence	 the	 probability	 of	 minority	
presidents	and	minority	governments;	(b)	that	these	
characteristics, and the minority governments they 
19 Julia	R.	Azari,	et al., 2013, The Presidential Leadership Dilemma: Between the Constitution and a Political Party,	Suny	Press,	New	York,	p.	
5.
20 As	Julia	R.	Azari,	Lara	M.	Brown	and	Zim	G.	Nwokora	argue	that	American	presidential	system	also,	with	only	two	biggest	parties	(Democrat	
and	Republic),	encounter	deadlock	when	it	comes	to	a	minority	of	votes	 in	parliament.	To	solve	the	problem,	lobbies	become	one	of	 the	
effective	ways	to	break	the	deadlock.	See	Ibid., p. 9.
21 David	E.	Apter,	1977,	Intoduction to Political Analysis, Winthrop Publishers Inc., Cambridge, p. 152.
22 Ibid., p. 156.
23 Arend	Lijphart,	1984,	Democracies: Pattern of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty­One Countries, Yale Universtity Press, 
New	Haven,	p.	85.
24 Julia	R.	Azari,	et al., Op.cit.,	p.	8-9.
25 Wiki	Summary,	“President’s	sources	of	power	(Richard	Neustadt)”,	http://wikisum.com/w/Neustadt:_Presidential_power,	accessed	12	January	
2016.
26 Julia	R.	Azari,	et al., Op.cit.,	p.	8-9.
27	 According	 to	Apter’	 analysis,	 political	 parties	 become	 a	 single-important	 medium	 in	 politics, competitiveness, bargaining process, and 
negotiations.	Political	party	enables	its	members	to	stand	closer	to	the	public	and	at	the	same	time,	becomes	a	different	figure	for	some	people	
as	well.	Moreover,	political	parties	become	 the	source	of	political	deviations.	But	 for	another	purpose,	parties	could	also	bring	changing	
moments	for	public	and	personal	opinions,	factions,	and	competing	demands	to	get	closer	to	the	public	interests.	See	David	E.	Apter,	Op.cit., 
pp.	151-152	and	155.
28	 Arend Lijphart, 2002, Parliamentary Versus Presidential Government,	Oxford	University	Press,	New	York,	p.	15.	
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generate,	do	not	make	deadlock	more	likely;	and	(c)	
that minority presidents, minority governments, and 
deadlock	do	not	affect	 the	survival	of	presidential	
democracies.	Together,	 these	findings	 suggest	 that	
the	view	that	explains	the	instability	of	presidential	
democracies	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 type	 of	 executive-
legislative relations these regimes are likely to 
induce must be abandoned.29
In	 the	 democratization	 context,	 multiparty	
system can open many positive and massive 
opportunities	for	society	to	participate	and	become	
part	of	the	direct	election.	This	condition	could	bring	
democracy into condusive political environment. 
But empirically, as Linz30 argued, the real problem 
is that a presidential regime leaves much less room 
for	tacit	consensus-building,	coalition-shifting,	and	
the	making	of	compromises	which,	though	prudent,	
are	hard	to	defend	in	public.	
The	 weaknesses	 can	 be	 more	 described,	 at	
least, in several conditions, i.e.:
Firstly,	 presidential	 with	 multiparty	 system	
can	lead	to	the	instability	of	cabinet	or	government,	
because	 it	 shares	 an	 equally-strong	 position	 for	
both branches. Consequently, in this design, 
political lobbies and negotiations among the parties 
in	 parliament	 become	 more	 rigid	 and	 inflexible,	
because	members	of	the	parliament	have	no	strong	
emotional-political	 relation	 to	 the	 president.	 As	
Bagehot stated that their mutual independence 
spells	 a	 mutual	 antagonism	 that	 weakens	 both	 of	
them.31
Secondly, to build a strong and cohesive 
political	 relation	 in	 a	 presidential-multiparty	
system, parties need to be more disciplined and 
consistent to support and maintain the coalition and 
the	cabinet.	This	pre-requisite	 is	more	natural	and	
logical in parliamentary system. Because Prime 
Minister	 and	 cabinet	 have	 to	 build	 a	 cohesive	
relation	with	the	parties	by	cleverly	combining	their	
executive	powers	with	the	responsibility	before	the	
parliament.	And	as	the	consequences,	it	will	lead	to	
the	well	disciplined	and	strong	political	parties.32 To 
support	the	argument,	Cheibub	explained	that:
[…] The majoritarian imperative that 
supposedly characterizes parliamentary 
regimes provides ineluctable incentives 
for	 political	 parties	 to	 cooperate	 with	 the	
government	 and	 for	 individual	 members	 of	
parliament	 to	 comply	with	 party	 directives.	
As	 a	 consequence,	 highly-disciplined	
parties	 tend	 to	cooperate	with	each	other	 in	
forming	 legislative	 coalitions	 out	 of	 which	
governments	 will	 emerge	 and	 upon	 which	
they	will	rely	for	their	existence.33
Thirdly,	 the	elect-president	 in	 a	presidential	
system	 is	 a	popular	figure	and	he/she	gains	direct	
support in public. But the popularity does not 
always	 bring	 support	 or	 acceptance	 from	 the	
majority	of	parties	 in	parliament.	Moreover,	when	
the	 president/cabinet	 and	 the	 majority	 of	 parties	
are	 in	 different	 sides	 or	 in	 a	 divided	 position.	
Eventhough,	 the	 parliament	 can	 not	 dissolve	 the	
cabinet	and	overthrow	the	president	but	it	will	lead	
both institutions into deadlock situation. 
Lastly,	 this	 design	 will	 force	 the	 president	
and	his/her	 supporting	 party	 to	 collaborate	 and	 to	
open	coalitions	with	other	parties	 in	parliament	 in	
many	potential	ways.	As	Cheibub	stated:	
Presidents	who	find	themselves	in	a	minority	
situation may enter into coalition to obtain 
thesupport	of	a	majority	in	congress.	They	do	
so by distributing cabinet positions to parties 
that pledge their support to the government in 
congress.		Government,	thus,	is	here	defined	
by all the parties that hold cabinet positions, 
and	the	government	legislatif	support	by	the	
sum	of	seats	held	by	all	the	parties	that	are	in	
the government.34
29 Jose	Antonio	 Cheibub,	 2002,	 “Minority	 Governments,	 Deadlock	 Situations,	 and	 the	 Survival	 of	 Presidential	 Democracies”, http://cps.
sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/35/3/284, accessed on 29 October 2009.
30 Juan	J.	Linz,	Op.cit., p. 68. 
31 Arend Lijphart, 2002, Op.cit., p. 15.
32 Ibid., p. 126.
33 Jose	Antonio	Cheibub,	Op. cit., p. 24.
34 Lowell	also	explained	that	coalition	cabinets	are	short-lived	compared	with	one	party	cabinet.	The	larger	the	number	of	discordant	groups	that	
form	the	majority	the	harder	the	task	of	pleasing	them	all,	and	more	feeble	and	unstable	the	position	of	the	cabinet.	See	also	Arend	Lijphart,	
1984,	Op. cit., p. 109. 
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3. Coalition-Building Experiences in Indone-
sian Presidential System
In Indonesian presidential multiparty system, 
coalitions	 have	 been	 frequently	 happened.	 There	
are many empirical evidences to describe various 
political practices and problems in the coalitons. 
From	the	era	of	former	President	Susilo	Bambang	
Yudhoyono	(SBY)	and	former	Vice-President	Muh.	
Jusuf	Kalla	(JK)	to	the	era	of	President	Joko	Widodo	
(Jokowi)	and	Vice	President	Muh.	Jusuf	Kalla	(JK),	
there	 have	 been	 many	 political	 experiences	 from	
each regime beside pros and cons related to the 
multiparty system. 
In a multiparty design as mentioned above, 
coalition	is	something	which	can	not	be	avoided	and	
denied	by	anybody	who	will	become	a	president.	It	
is an inevitable thing because it can bring stability 
and	effectiveness	for	the	president	and	the	cabinet.35 
Basically,	a	successful	and	cohesive	coalition	needs	
so many supporting elements and a condusive 
political	environment.	But	from	another	perspective,	
it	 also	 depends	 on	 the	 capacity	 of	 the	 leader	 and	
member	of	the	party	to	see	the	potential	coalitions	
among	many	political	interests	cleverly	and	wisely.	
Lijphart36	 explained	 that	 there	 are	 several	 reasons	
which	 can	 bring	 the	 failures	 to	 predict	 cabinet	
coalitions	satisfactorily:	
First,	 parties’	 policy	 preferences	 cannot	 be	
ignored.	This	means	that	parties	are	not	pure	power	
maximizers.	 They	 want	 to	 participate	 in	 cabinets	
not	 just	 in	 order	 to	 hold	 a	 share	 of	 governmental	
power	but	also	to	collaborate	with	other	like-minded	
parties and to advance particular policies.  
Second, a major problem in evaluating 
coalition	theories	is	how	to	define	the	membership	
of	 coalitions.	A	 political	 party	 is	 a	 member	 of	 a	
cabinet	coalition	if	one	or	more	of	its	representatives	
become	cabinet	ministers.	But	it	also	possible	for	a	
party	to	support	a	cabinet	without	entering	it.	
Third,	 the	 assumption	 that	 parties	 want	 to	
acquire	 a	 maximum	 share	 of	 cabinet	 power	 is	
usually	interpreted	as	implying	that	 they	will	seek	
to	enter	a	cabinet	whenever	a	new	cabinet	has	to	be	
formed.	
Fourth,	 the	 assumption	 of	 power	 maxi-
mization leads to prediction that the smallest 
possible	 winning	 coalitions	 will	 be	 formed,	 but	
there may be important countervailing pressures 
that	will	tend	to	enlarge	coalitions.	
Fifth,	 another	 factor	 that	 may	 force	 the	
enlargement	of	coalitions	is	that	“winning”	does	not	
always	mean	merely	having	a	regular	parliamentary	
majority.
And lastly, conversely, a cabinet may be 
“winning”	 with	 less	 than	 majority	 support	 in	
parliament.	 This	 can	 be	 achieved	 	 not	 only	 with	
the	 help	 of	 steady	 support	 parties,	 as	 discussed	
earlier,	but	also	if	a	cabinet	is	able	to	find	shifting	
parliamentary majorities to lend support on votes 
confidence	and	legislative	proposals.	
Empirically,	by	capturing	the	experiences	of	
political parties in Indonesia, it can be concluded 
that	there	are	some	indicators	to	analyze	what	type	
of	 coalitions	 possibly	 occurred.	 Those	 indicators	
are	 size	 of	 coalitions	 which	 likely	 arranged	 with	
the	 calculation	 of	 the	 amount	 of	 members	 in	
parliament,	policy	preferences	and	ideology	carried	
by	 the	parties,	 record	of	 the	party	discipline	 from	
its	 prior	 coalitions,	 cohesiveness	 level	 of	 the	
political	 parties,	 behaviors	 of	 most	 members	 in	
parliament	 in	 responding	 the	 cabinet’	 policy	 and	
the	directives	of	the	parties,	and	forms	of	coalition	
institutionalization.  
a. Coalition Building in The Era of 
SBY-JK and SBY-Boediono
Coalition	 practices	 in	 both	 of	 eras	
are	 actually	 different.	 The	 differences	 are	
caused	by	some	factors,	i.e.:	the	composition	
35 The	 difficulties	 of	 the	 combination	 of	 presidentialism	 and	multiparty	 systems	 are	 compounded	 by	 the	 problems	 of	 coalition	 building	 in	
presidential	systems.	In	a	multiparty	system,	the	chief	executive’s	party	rarely	if	ever	enjoys	a	majority	in	the	legislature.	Consequently,	to	
attain	a	majority,	 interparty	coalition	building	 is	 essential.	 In	multiparty	parliamentary	 systems,	coalition	building	often	creates	 the	basis	
for	 a	 stable	 government.	Building	 stable	 coalitions	 is	 considerably	more	 difficult	 in	multiparty	 presidential	 democracies.	 See	 also	 Scott	
Mainwaring,	Op.cit., p. 21.
36 Arend	Lijphart,	1984,	Op.cit.,	pp.	52-55.
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of	supporting	parties,	political	modalities	of	
each	President	and	Vice-President,	form	and	
political	 reason	 of	 the	 coalition,	 and	 party	
compositions in the parliament. 
1) The Era of SBY-JK (2005-
2009)
In	 the	era	of	SBY-JK,	coalition	
was	 basically	 made	 in	 order	 to	 reap	
the	 majority	 of	 chairs	 in	 parliament.	
At	 that	 time,	 PDI-P,	 as	 one	 of	 the	
biggest party in parliament, chose 
to	 be	 the	 opponent	 without	 any	
intentions to enter coalition intiated by 
the	 Democratic	 Party	 (Demokrat)	 to	
support	the	cabinet	of	SBY-JK.37 
This	 pair	 of	 candicates	 was	
initially	supported	by	only	four	parties	
(Democrats,	PBB,	PKPI	and	PKS)	with	
a	minority	 of	members	 in	 parliament	
(113	chairs	or	20.5%).38 The coalition 
was	declared	as	“Kerakyatan”	coalition	
(Koalisi	 Kerakyatan).	 Fortunately,	
JK’	 winning	 as	 the	 new	 leader	 of	
Golkar	Party	(Golkar)	at	VII-National	
Conference	 in	 Bali	 had	 turned	 the	
position	 from	a	balancing	party	 to	be	
part	of	the	coaliton.39 
Furthermore,	 the	 shifting	 of	
political	 position	 of	 Golkar	 and	 the	
victory	of	SBY-JK	 in	 the	Presidential	
Election	had	influenced	some	political	
parties to join the coalition, such as, 
PAN,	 PBR,	 and	 Pelopor.	 This	 new	
collaboration	 made	 the	 position	 of	
coalition to be the majority.40 
As mentioned above, in 
presidential	 system	 with	 multiparty	
design, political coalition character 
is not tightly bound and consistent 
as in parliamentary system. It can be 
seen	from	the	records	of	the	coalition	
members	in	the	era	of	SBY-JK	which	
had	 low	 discipline	 and	 cohesiveness.	
Conflicts	 among	 the	 political	 parties	
in	coalitions	and	between	the	coalition	
and	 the	 cabinet	 were	 frequently	
happened	 rather	 than	 with	 party	
members outside the coalition. This 
condition	 made	 some	 members	 of	
coalitions become more opposite than 
PDI-P	as	the	real	opponent.	
Moreover,	personal	competition	
between	 SBY	 as	 the	 President	 and	
JK	 as	 the	 Vice-President	 had	 come	
up	 during	 the	 tenure	 of	 the	 cabinet.	
This condition eventually made SBY 
chose	 to	separate	with	JK	 in	 the	next	
Presidential	Election	 in	 2009.	At	 that	
time,	SBY	chose	Mr.	Boediono	(former	
Governor	of	Indonesian	Central	Bank	
and	a	public	official	with	no	political	
background)	 as	 the	 next	 candidate	 of	
Vice-President.	And	at	the	same	time,	
JK	picked	Mr.	Wiranto	 as	 his	 pair	 of	
candidates.
If	 we	 analyze	 the	 type	 of	
coalitions	 from	Lijphart’s	 perspective	
as	 mentioned	 before,	 the	 coalition	 in	
this era, actually, can be concluded 
as	 one	 of	 the	 examples	 of	 “Minimal	
Winning	 Coalitions”.	 It	 can	 be	 seen	
from	 the	 initial	 intention	 of	 the	
members	 in	 coalition	 (and	 also	 the	
candidates)	 to	 collect	 the	majority	 of	
votes in parliament in order to support 
the	program	and	policy	of	the	cabinet	
37	 In	frequent	moments	and	political	relations,	PDI-P	also	declared	the	term	“balancing	party”.	This	was	also	what	Golkar	used	before	joining	
the	coalition	with	the	Democrat.	
38	 In	this	era,	parliament	was	dominated	by	two	groups	of	coalition,	“Koalisi	Kerakyatan”	as	the	supporters	for	SBY-JK	and	“Koalisi	Kebangsaan”	
as	the	opponent	or	balancing	parties	initiated	by	PDI-P.
39 Siska	Yuspitasari,	“Sistem	Multipartai	di	Era	Pemerintahan	Susilo	Bambang	Yudhoyono	2004-2009”,	Jurnal Dinamika Politik,	Vol.	1,	No.	1,	
August	2012,	p.	28.	
40 Ibid., p. 29.
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and	 the	 elect-President	 and	 Vice-
President. In addition, the distribution 
of	ministerial	positions	for	the	coalition	
members	showed	that	political	parties	
are	 interested	 in	 maximizing	 their	
power	through	holding	as	many	of	the	
cabinet positions as possible. 
2) The Era of SBY-Boediono 
(2009-2014) 
In this era, many scholars 
viewed	 that	 the	 candidacy	 of	 Mr.	
Boediono	 as	 the	 next	 Vice-President	
for	SBY	was	a	bit-forced.	It	is	because	
Mr.	Boediono’	profile	as	a	non-partisan	
and	a	pure	public	official	without	any	
experience	 in	 political	 relation	 with	
any	 party.	 Eventhough	 the	 coalition	
members	 had	 some	 figures	 who	 can	
be promoted. But, at that time, many 
polings	were	still	reckoning	SBY	as	the	
most	popular	figure	for	the	candidacy	
no	 matter	 who	 was	 the	 candidate	 of	
the	 Vice-President.	 And	 this	 benefit	
made Democrat Party and SBY had a 
legitimacy	 to	choose	 the	candidate	of	
Vice-President	of	its	own.41
The election in 2009 brought 
out	 9	 (nine)	 political	 parties	 (from	
38	 participated	 in	 the	 election)42 to 
enter	 the	 parliament	 with	 no	 single	
party	 had	 the	 majority	 of	 votes.	
Even	 the	 Democratic	 Party,	 as	 the	
largest gathering, had only come up 
with	 26.4%	 votes	 or	 148	 chairs	 in	
parliament	(from	total	number	of	560	
chairs).	The	result	had	forced	SBY	and	
Democrat and the initial supporting 
members to invite other parties in 
parliament to enter the coalition, such 
as,	 Golkar	 (which	 had	 been	 defeated	
in the election and had chose Aburizal 
Bakrie	 as	 the	 new	 leader	 of	 Golkar	
Party),	 PKS,	 PPP,	 PAN,	 and	 PKB.	
The	 new	 coalition	 finally	 made	 423	
chairs	in	the	parliament,	far	above	the	
minimal	majority	of	votes	(51%).
The	 coalition	model	 in	 the	Era	
of	 SBY-Boediono	 was	 quite	 similar	
with	previous	coalition	in	2005-2009.	
Eventhough,	 there	 were	 still	 some	
differences	 between	 the	 two	 periods.	
Learning	 from	 the	 past	 experiences,	
the Democratic Party had tried to build 
stronger and more cohesive coalition. 
The	Party	wanted	each	of	the	coalition	
members to be more consistent and 
well-diciplined	to	support	the	cabinet.	
One	 of	 the	 political	 approaches	 that	
the Democrat and coalition members 
used is by institutionalizing the 
coalition	through	a	“Joint	Secretariat”	
declaration	 (Sekretariat	 Gabungan)	
with	a	memorandum	of	understanding	
document,	signed	by	each	leader	of	the	
parties. 
But, evidently, an institutional 
approach in political relation is not the 
panacea to attain a stable and cohesive 
coalition. The real problems stem 
from	the	design	of	the	multiparty	and	
presidential	 system	 itself.	 Conflicts	
between	 the	cabinet	 and	 the	coalition	
and	 among	 the	members	 of	 the	 Joint	
Secretariat	 emerged	 frequently.	 And	
it	 was	 even	 more	 evident	 than	 the	
conflict	 between	 the	 Democrat	 and	
PDI-P.43	 Moreover,	 sometimes,	 some	
members	 of	 the	 coalition	 built	 an	
informal	 political	 relation	 with	 the	
opposite party.
41 Personal	competition	between	SBY	and	JK	can	not	be	prevented	too	and	sometimes	it	was	influenced	by	both	parties.	
42 Antara	News,	“38	Parpol	Ditetapkan	Menjadi	Peserta	Pemilu	2009”,	http://www.antara.co.id/view/?i=1218891252&c=NAS&s=, accessed on 
24	Mei	2010.
43 JPSK-case	was	only	one	of	the	evident	facts	to	point	out	the	conflicts	and	indisciplines	of	the	coalition	members.	
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	 If	 we	 used	 the	 theory	 of	
coalitions	 from	Lijphart’s	 perspective	
as	 mentioned	 before,	 the	 coalition	 in	
the	era	of	SBY-Boediono,	actually,	can	
be	 concluded	 as	 one	 of	 the	 examples	
of	 “Minimal	 Winning	 Coalitions”	
as	 well.	 It	 can	 be	 argued	 from	 the	
initial	 intention	 of	 the	 members	
of	 coalition	 to	 collect	 the	 majority	
of	 votes	 in	 parliament	 in	 order	 to	
support	the	program	and	policy	of	the	
cabinet.	Although,	 by	 declaring	 Joint	
Secretariat,	 there	was	 an	 initial	 effort	
and intention to build the coalition on 
the	basis	of	policy	preferences	and	not	
only	consider	the	majority	of	votes	as	
the	 background,	 but	 this	 effort	 was	
apparently useless. 
Learning	 from	 the	 case,	
Democrat	 and	 the	 intial	 members	 of	
coalition actually can consider another 
approach in building stronger and 
more cohesive coalition. The concept 
of	 “Minimal	 Range	 Coalitions”	
or	 “Minimal	 Connected	 Winning	
Coalitions”	can	be	applied	as	well,	by	
excluding	 the	 undisciplined	members	
of	coalition	and	giving	more	attention	
to the loyal parties. 
b. Coalition Building in The Era of 
Jokowi-JK (2014-2019)
Coalition	 building	 in	 the	 era	 of	
President	 Joko	 Widodo	 and	 Vice-President	
Jusuf	 Kalla	 (Jokowi-JK)	 is	 empirically	
different	 with	 the	 coalition	 models	 in	 two	
prior periods. Although, there are some 
evidences	 which	 make	 it	 similar	 with	 the	
previous practices.  
Legislative election in 2014 has 
resulted	 10	 (ten)	 political	 parties	 which	
have right to be seated in parliament. The 
composition	 of	 the	 members	 in	 parliament	
from	each	political	partiy	can	be	described	in	
the	following	table.44 
Table 1.
Result of Indonesia Legislative Election 2014
No. Political Parties Chairs
Percentage 
(%)
1 PDI-P 109 19.46
2 Golkar	Party 91 16.25
3 Gerindra	Party 73 13.04
4 Democratic Party 61 10.89
5 PAN 48 8.57
6 PKB 47 8.39
7 PKS 40 7.14
8 PPP 39 6.96
9 National	Democratic	
Party
36 6.43
10 Hanura 16 2.86
Total Number 560 100.0
Source:	 	Website	 Indonesian	House	 of	Represen-
tatives, 2014
The	table	shows	that	there	is	no-single	
party	 with	 majority	 status	 in	 parliament.	
Further,	10	 (ten)	political	parties	 could	also	
mean	10	(ten)	or	more	political	interests	and	
policy	 preferences	 which	 can	 bring	 many	
considerations	 in	building	a	variety	 form	of	
coalitions. 
In	 this	 era,	 there	 are	 only	 two	 grand	
coalitions:	 “Merah-Putih”	 Coalition	 (KMP)	
which	was	initially	made	by	6	(six)	parties:	5	
(five)	in	parliament	and	1	(one)	party	outside	
the	parliament	i.e.:	Gerindra,	PAN,	PPP,	PKS,	
Golkar,	 and	 PBB.	 The	 Democrat,	 former	
presiding	 party	 in	 two	 previous	 cabinets,	 is	
taking position to be a balancing or neutral 
party	 in	 the	 parliament.	 Along	 with	 the	
political	dynamics	among	the	parties,	PPP	(at	
44 Indonesian	House	of	Representatives,	“Fraksi”,	http://www.dpr.go.id/tentang/fraksi,	accessed	on	12	January	2016.
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October	2014)	and	PAN	(at	September	2015)	
decided	 to	 secede	 from	 the	KMP	 coalition.	
Both	parties	shifted	their	position	to	support	
the	 cabinet	 of	 Jokowi-JK	 and	 collaborating	
together	 with	 PDI-P	 in	 “Indonesia	 Hebat”	
Coalition	(KIH).45 
“Indonesia	 Hebat”	 Coalition	 (KIH)	
consists	of	PDI-P	(as	the	leader	of	the	grand	
coalition),	PKB,	Nasdem,	Hanura,	and	PKPI	
(outside	 the	 parliament).	 This	 coalition	
was	 declared	 on	 19	 May	 2014	 at	 Djoeang	
Building,	Jakarta.	And	as	mentioned	before,	
the	 dynamics	 of	 politics	 in	 Indonesia	make	
PPP	and	PAN	decide	to	retreat	from	the	KMP	
coalition	and	officially	declare	 to	be	part	of	
the	new	member	in	KIH	coalition.46
Before	 October	 2014	 and	 September	
2015,	 “Indonesia	 Hebat”	 Coalition	 (KIH)	
only	possessed	208	chairs	 in	 the	parliament	
consisting	of	109	for	PDI-P,	36	for	Nasdem,	
47	 for	PKB,	 and	16	 for	Hanura.47	This	was	
a	 minority	 coalition	 in	 parliament	 with	 all	
the	 facts	 that	 chairmans	 of	 parliament	 and	
MPR	are	controlled	by	KMP	representatives.	
But in October 2014 and September 2015, 
KIH	coalition	was	added	by	PPP	and	PAN.	
By joining the coalition, both parties have 
made KIH coalition to be the majority in 
parliament, by collecting 295 chairs. This 
turning	 situation	 left	 KMP	 with	 only	 204	
chairs in parliament and the rest is controlled 
by	the	Democrats	with	only	61	chairs	as	the	
balancing or neutral party.48
Considering	 the	 facts	 above,	 we	 can	
say	 that	 initially,	 PDI-P	 was	 focusing	 to	
initiate	an	effective	and	 long-lived	coalition	
even	 with	 only	 minority	 of	 members	 in	
parliament. But the important modalities 
in that coalition are the commitment and 
cohesiveness	 from	 each	 member.	 This	 fact	
shows	that	the	commitment	and	discipline	of	
KIH	coalition	are	better	than	the	KMP’.	
Apart	from	the	facts	mentioned	above,	
there	are	 some	 factors	causing	 the	coalition	
in	 KMP	was	 short-lived	 within	 less	 than	 1	
(one)	year.	These	 factors	 can	be	 considered	
as	 indirect	 supports	 for	 KIH	 to	 gain	 and	
maintain its coalition stronger and more 
cohesive	than	the	KMP.	Those	factors	are	as	
follows:
Firstly,	 internal	 conflict	 of	 two	
established	political	parties	in	KMP	coalition,	
PPP	 and	 Golkar.	 It	 is	 even	 worst	 because	
both	 parties	 are	 now	 disintegrated	 into	 two	
managements.	One	of	 them	has	declared	as	
the	new	PPP	and	Golkar	party.	The	separation	
has	also	influenced	members	in	parliament	to	
turn	their	commitment	from	KMP	coalition.
Secondly,	informal	and	liquid	political	
approach	 used	 by	 PDI-P	 and	 its	 coalition	
members	in	building	a	political	relation	with	
KMP	 coalition	members	 and	 even	with	 the	
Democrats	is	well-maintained.	
Thirdly,	 Jokowi-JK	 does	 not	 focus	
in gathering many members to enter the 
coalition	but	effective	partners	to	support	the	
government. This option makes the cabinet 
giving more attentions to policy and program 
and	 then	 building	 images	 of	 the	 cabinet	 as	
hard	workers	and	committing	to	the	public.49 
Fourthly,	 initial	 members	 of	 the	
coalition are cohesive and closely related 
to	PDI-P	 as	 the	 leader	 and	 initiator	 of	KIH	
coalition.	 It	 is	 different	 with	 the	 initial	
members	in	KMP.	This	factor	may	be	one	of	
the	 influential	sides	 for	other	parties	 to	 turn	
their	 political	 position	 and	 be	willing	 to	 be	
part	of	the	coalition.
45 Wikipedia,	“Koalisi	Merah	Putih”,	https://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Koalisi_Merah_Putih \,	accessed	on	12	January	2016.
46 Ibid. 
47	 PKPI	was	excluded	because	it	has	no	chair	in	parliament.	
48	 Ibid.
49 Before	the	Presidential	election	and	at	the	beginning	of	his	term	of	office	as	the	President,	Jokowi	popularized	a	slogan	“Kerja!	Kerja!	Kerja!”.
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Lastly, classic political reason that 
political	 party	 always	 tends	 to	 maximize	
its	 power	 and	 existence	 by	 choosing	 to	
be	 partner	 of	 the	 cabinet.	 Coalition	 in	
presidential	 system	 would	 give	 more	
opportunities	for	members	to	be	appointed	as	
public	officials	or	even	a	minister	with	high	
prestige	 and	valuable	 experience.	Moreover	
if	 the	 president	 and	 the	 cabinet	 are	 very	
popular	and	have	high	confidence	in	the	eyes	
of	public.	This	factor	can	be	considered	as	the	
political	externalities.	
	 If	we	used	the	theory	of	coalitions	
from	Lijphart’s	 perspective,	 the	 coalition	 in	
the	 era	 of	 Jokowi-JK,	 actually,	 can	 be	 seen	
as	 one	of	 the	 examples	of	 “Minimal	Range	
Coalitions”	which	is	intended	to	get	supports	
to	 form	 and	 maintain	 coalitions	 among	
parties	with	 similar	 policy	 preferences	 than	
among	parties	that	are	far	apart.
	 Further,	 PDI-P	 is	 trying	 to	 build	
more cohesive and stronger coalitions by 
applying	such	an	idea	of	“Minimal	Connected	
Winning	 Coalitions”50. This argumentation 
is	based	on	 the	fact	 that	when	shaping	KIH	
coalition,	PDI-P	did	not	give	much	attention	
to collect as many parties as possible to 
join	 the	 coalitions,	 though,	 PPP	 and	 PAN	
have	finally	chosen	to	change	their	political	
interest	 from	KMP	 to	KIH.	 In	 this	 context,	
PDI-P	looks	for	connected	parties	 to	join	in	
based on their political interest and policy 
preferences	 to	 support	 Jokowi-JK	 in	 the	
cabinet.
C. Conclusion
In	 a	 presidential	 system	 with	 multiparty	
design,	coalition	is	an	inevitable	thing.	Even	when	
many	empirical	facts	denote	that	coalition	does	not	
guarantee	a	stable	and	effective	government,	but	in	
many	 moments,	 President	 will	 need	 coalitions	 to	
support	 his/her	 policy	 and	 program	 in	 parliament	
and in public.
In	order	to	get	around	the	effective	coalition	
in a presidential system, President should not put 
his/her	expectation	only	to	the	members	of	coalition,	
because	 empirically	 there	 is	 no	 relation	 between	
coalitions	 in	 parliament	 with	 the	 support	 in	 the	
cabinet.	 President	 also	 has	 to	 use	 his/her	 political	
and	non-political	modalities	as	a	coalition	builder	to	
gain sympathy and positive image in parliament and 
in	public.	His/her	informal	and	liquid	approach	can	
bring	chances	to	open	another	relation	with	neutral	
or even opposite party. 
Presidential coalition character is very 
different	 compared	 to	 parliamentary	 system.	
Coalition in a parliamentary design is more 
naturally and logically happened. Coalition model 
in	presidential	system	is	a	pseudo-coalition	because	
it	does	not	always	bring	stability	and	cohesiveness	
within	 the	 coalition	 and	 cabinet,	 but	 long-lived	
conflicts	 and	 even	 delegitimacy	 for	 the	 President	
and	cabinet	in	the	eye	of	society.		
From	 the	 empirical	 evidences	 of	 three	 era	
of	 cabinet,	 coalition	 should	 not	 only	 be	 based	 on	
the	size	of	the	members	but	also	on	the	similarities	
of	policy	preferences,	 interests,	 political	 relations,	
and	ideology.	These	factors	will	bring	more	stable,	
cohesive,	and	well-diciplined	coalition	in	supporting	
the cabinet.
50 The	underlying	assumption	of	this	theory	is	that	parties	will	try	to	coalesce	with	their	immediate	neighbors	and	that	other	adjacent	parties	will	
be	added	until	a	majority	coalition	is	formed.	See	Arend	Lijphart,	1999,	Op.cit., pp. 99.
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